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Abstract:  
 
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between corruption, taxation and economic 
growth. Our contributions are twofold. Theoretically, in an endogenous growth model, we 
introduce corruption in two different ways: corruption in the public expenditure and corruption 
in the public revenue. We show two opposing effects. Under certain conditions, corruption can 
affect growth rate positively but it can also exert a negative effect via fiscal revenue. Not only 
does it tend to make the tax rate, which maximizes the long run growth rate sub-optimal, but it 
can also create distortions that can lead to excessive tax rates harmful to growth.  
 
The empirical analyses are based on non parametric estimates as well as econometric 
investigations. Our results support the assumption of a non linear relationship between public 
resources and growth. Interactions between public resources and institutional variables 
evidence the following the results: (i) the more countries are corrupt the stronger the negative 
effects of taxation on the growth (ii) Once the negative effects of corruption are accounted for, 
our data do not support a potential positive effect of corruption on economic growth. 
 
 
Key words: Corruption, taxation, growth, developing countries 
JEL classifications: H2, O43. 
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 Introduction 
 
Recent studies have showed that corruption i) reduces public tax revenues (Ghura, 1998; 
Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Attila et al, 2008; ii) has adverse effect on the tax morality of taxpayers 
(Torgler, 2004, 2005, 2007); iii) and distorts a country’s tax structure. These various findings suggest 
that there are three mechanisms by which corruption in fiscal administration affects economic 
growth. Firstly, by decreasing the resources available for public authorities, corruption will reduce 
the productive public investments in such areas as roads, health and education. This effect is 
accentuated since the tax morale of economic agents is affected. Secondly, by worsening the 
distortions on the level of taxation and its structure, corruption reduces growth more than the harmful 
effect of taxation alone. Lastly, by allowing economic agents, in particular private companies to 
reduce their fiscal burden, corruption can have an indirect “positive effect” on growth if the revenue 
from unpaid taxes is then used to finance new investments1.  
This paper intends to disentangle both the positive effects and negative effects stemming 
from the interaction between corruption, public resources and growth. Addressing such an issue is 
critical for efficient public policy in developing countries. Reducing corruption results in better good 
governance and greater transparency in public finance management and hence increases public 
resources. However, consistent with the “Laffer curve2”, increasing tax pressure could lead to 
adverse effects on economic activities. Hence, even though increases in public resources are likely to 
help governments in providing quantitatively and qualitatively more public goods, these benefits may 
be offset by negative effects on growth due to higher taxes. As regards the two opposing effects, a 
tradeoff is needed. How optimal should taxation be if corruption has a greatly detrimental effect on 
fiscal policy? How can anti-corruption policy and fiscal policy be reconciled in order to stimulate 
economic growth? Theoretical and empirical investigations should provide greater insight into these 
problems.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold: theoretical and empirical. From the theoretical point 
of view, this paper is an extension of previous works by Barreto and Alm (2003) and Coppier (2005) 
who analyzed the interactions between corruption, taxation and growth. It differs in modeling 
corruption in two ways: bribes taken from public expenditure and bribes taken from public fiscal 
revenue in an endogenous growth model. Coppier (2005) considers that corruption affects the profits 
                                                 
1
 Such an effect is line with the theory of beneficial corruption developed by Leff (1964), Nye (1967) suggesting that 
corruption might actually enhance efficiency when public regulation or bureaucracy is excessive. For a critique see Kurer 
(1993). Meon and Sekkat (2005), Meon and Weill (2006) have provided an empirical test of this theory. In particular, 
Meon and Sekkat estimates do not support the “grease the wheels” view of corruption.  
2
 Strictly speaking the Laffer curve relates tax revenues to the tax rate. 
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of private enterprises while Barreto and Alm (2003) define corruption as an indirect rent extracted by 
the public official, who creates a monopoly situation when providing some public goods. Coppier 
(2005) emphasized the importance of taking into account corruption in the explanation of the relation 
between taxation and growth, whereas Barreto and Alm (2003) focused more on the effects on 
welfare. In this study, we propose an alternative framework. 
From an empirical point of view, unlike others studies the present work is based on non 
parametric estimates and an instrumental variable approach (Generalized Method of Moments). 
Many studies have analyzed the effects of taxation and tax structure or more particularly of tax 
policy on the growth (King and Rebelo, 1990; Martin and Fardmanesh, 1990; Barro and Salt-I-
Martin, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro, 1997, 1998; Chen, 2003; Lee and Gordon, 2005). 
However, to our knowledge no econometric study has attempted to take into account the the effects 
of corruption in the explanation of the taxation and growth nexus. This study aims at filling this gap 
and thereby to connect two areas of investigation: the relation between corruption and public revenue 
and the effect of taxation on growth.   
This paper is organized as follows. In section I we develop an endogenous growth model in 
which corruption is defined as a rent misappropriated from public expenditure and as rent taken from 
tax revenue. Section II and III are devoted to respectively empirical analyses and econometric 
results.  
 
Section 1- Corruption, taxation and growth: the endogenous model of growth revisited  
 
1.1- Theoretical framework and assumptions 
 
Let us consider a production function of Cobb-Douglas type with a constant return scale: 
 
1-(1- )t t g ty Ak b g
αα  =    (1) 
The rate of depreciation of k  is δ . Production in the private sector requires the supply of 
public capital provided by the State. However public expenditure is affected by corruption so that 
only a proportion (1 gb− ) of public capital is available for production. This formulation of the 
function of production is based on Barro (1990) but the difference here is in gb  , which represents the 
proportion of productive public expenditure misappropriated by the public official in charge of their 
management. As formulated, the function of production is in line with that in the study of Del Monte 
and Papagni (2001), in which corruption appears as a direct theft of public property (Mauro, 1995). 
gb
 
can also be interpreted as a “public bad” resulting from the negative externality of public 
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intervention. This modeling of corruption differs from that of authors like Coppier (2005), who 
posited that corruption affects the profits of the private enterprises and Barreto and Alm (2003), who 
considered it as an indirect rent taken by the public agent which creates a discretionary monopoly 
situation in the supply of public goods.  
The government finances its public expenditure ( tg ) and transfers ( ts ) (considered to be 
exogenous) using the taxes levied on production revenue ytτ and the taxation on consumption ( ctτ ). 
Taxes are function of bribes. The budgetary constraint is written as: 
 ( )t t tg s bττ+ =  (2) 
 
As in the study of Ellis and Fender (2006), the process of accumulation of public capital as 
thus described takes into account the existence of corruption, but unlike these authors, we rather 
consider that taxation is affected by corruption. This last assumption is more plausible, and 
consistent with the literature on tax avoidance and corruption (Chen, 2003; Coppier, 2005). If 
eτ represents the actual tax rate which results from corruption, one can write: 
 
 
[ ]
( ) 1 (1 )
( ) 1 (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
y y y
e t y y
c c c
e t c c
y c y y
t e e t y t c
b b
b b
b b bτ
τ τ τ β
τ τ τ β
τ τ τ τ τ
 = = − − 
= = − −
= + = +  (3)
 
 
In the relation (3)  and y ye eτ τ  s are actual tax rates on income and consumption. These rates depend 
on two elements: >0 and 0y cb b > which are bribes respectively extracted on income tax and on 
consumption tax and 0β > the proportion due to tax avoidance. The government finances its 
activities with income tax and consumption tax. The actual revenues from taxes are equal to: 
 
 [ ]   1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
y c
e e e
y c
y c
y c
b y b c
τ τ τ
β τ β τ
= +
 = − − + − − 
 (4) 
The economy consists of n identical agents who are holders of the factors of production. They 
accumulate the capital, rent it to firms and decide on their choice of consumption, investment and 
allocation of the factors in order to maximize their intertemporal utility: 
 
 
0
( )t tU e U c dtρ
∞
−
= ∫  (5) 
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ρ  designates the intertemporal preference rate. The function of utility is constant elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (CES): 
 
1( )( ) 1       for 1
1
( )              for  1
t
t
t t
cU c
U c Logc
θ
θ
θ
θ
−
= − ≠
−
= =
 (6) 
θ  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
At each period, the constraint of the economy’s resources is given by: 
 t(1 ) (1 )  where c  is the private consumptiony ct e t e t tk y c kτ τ δ= − − + −&  (7) 
 
1.2-Long run growth rate determination 
 
The optimization problem of the representative consumer is thus: 
{ }
t U(c )
st: (1 ) (1 )
tc
y c
t e t e t tk y c k
Max
τ τ δ= − − + −&
 (8) 
Hence, households choose c and k  so as to maximize (8) subject to the constraints (1) and (7)
.  
The Hamiltonian is written as ( , , ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )y ct t t t t e t e t tH c k U c y c kλ λ τ τ δ = + − − + −   
The maximization conditions are the following: 
'( ) (1 ) 0           (a)0
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) '( )        ( )
t c
t e
y c
e t e t t
y
e
H e u c
c
Hk k y c k b
H
f k ck
ρ λ τ
τ τ δλ
λ λ λ τ λδ
−∂  − + =
= ∂
 ∂ 
= ⇔ = − − + − ∂ 
∂ 
= −  = − − +∂ 
K
& & K
&
& K
  (9) 
 
From equation (a), we derive '( )
1
t
c
e
e u cρλ
τ
−
=
+
. By differentiating λ  with respect to time, we 
get: 1 '( ) "( )
1
t t
e
c
e u c e cu cρ ρλ ρ
τ
− − = − + +
& & . Substituting λ  and λ& in equation (c) results in 
( ) ( ) 1'( ) 1 1
"( )
y
e g
u c g
c A b
u c k
α
τ α δ ρ
−  
= − − − − −  
   
&
 ; from where taking into account the functional form 
of the function of utility, we determine: 
( ) ( ) 11 1 1ye gc gA b
c k
α
γ τ α δ ρ
θ
−  
= = − − − −  
   
&
 (10) 
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1.3- Interaction between corruption, taxation and growth 
 
As described the model appears as a combination of the model of Chen (2003) which does 
not explicitly take into account bribes, and the model of Eichhorn (2004). From the government 
budget constraint, it follows that: 
 
y c
e e
g y c s
k k k k
τ τ= + −  (11) 
Substituting (11) in (10) yields: 
 
( )
1
1 (1 ) 1y y ce g e e
y c sA b
k k k
α
γ α τ τ τ δ ρ
θ
−
    = − − + − − −  
    
    (12) 
Equation (12) is equivalent to the standard result according to which economic growth is a 
non linear function of income tax (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Tax on consumption does not 
directly affect growth rate but indirectly through its effects on capital accumulation.  
 
 
1.3.1- Effects of corruption 
 
Corruption affects the long run growth rates in two ways: (i) by its impact on taxes rates and 
(ii) by its impact on public capital g3. 
In the regime without corruption, it stands that yeτ τ=  and the growth rate is higher than in 
the regime with corruption. In contrast if bribery is accepted- that is  and y cb b  vary – it can be easily 
shown that the effect of taxation on the growth rate is always negative but is of a smaller scale. 
Hence, 
 
 
( )
1 (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) ( 01 )
c
y e y
y
c
g y g e y y
c s yA b
b k k k
y c s yb b b
k k k k
αγ
α τ τ β
θ
α β τ β τ τ β
−∂   
= − − + −  
  
 
− − − −

− − − − + −

>< 
 
 
 
 (13) 
  
                                                 
3
 Our results are conditioned by two implicit assumptions: (i) consumption taxes are constant and (i) bribes paid on these 
tax revenue are constant. 
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Depending on the parameters of the model and the structure of the economy, equation (13) could be 
negative, positive or both. Thus, two effects are observable. On the one hand, individuals have strong 
incentives to accept and pay more bribes so as to diminish the tax burden. Therefore that opportunity 
allows them to increase their investments. On the other hand, the amount of taxes paid by the 
taxpayer being lower than the amount required4, it follows that the economic agent increases his 
savings level and thereby accumulates more capital (Eichhorn, 2004).  
 In contrast, corruption in public spending negatively impacts on growth. 
( )( ) ( )1 1 1 (1 ) 1 1 0
1 and 0
y
y g
g
y
g gb A b
b k k
b
αγ
τ β α α
θ
β
−∂  
 = − − − − − − <  ∂  
∀ < >
  (14) 
Hence, productive public investment is reduced by corruption (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; de la Croix 
and Delavallade, 2006). 
 When the positive and negative effects of corruption are put together, we can derive the 
condition that allows the incidence of corruption to be minimized. By combining equations 
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. and (14), we can deduce the marginal rate of tax pressure 
ˆ
yτ
 
that makes it possible to cancel out the two opposing effects of corruption on growth:  
 
( )
( )( )
1
1
ˆ
1 1 (
g
y
y g y
g b
k
A b b b
α
α
τ
α β α
−
 
− 
 
=
− − + −
 (15) 
ˆyτ
 is referred to as the optimal tax of corruption. 
 
1.3.2- Optimal income tax and corruption: implication for growth 
 
Let us consider that the aim of public authorities is to maximize the growth rate of 
consumption. Barro (1990) and Chen (2003) show that this optimization is equivalent to the 
maximization of well-being of the representative agent if (i) the rate of substitution between g and k 
is equal to unity and (ii) if the utility function is bounded, that is less than a certain limit. The first 
condition is verified since we use the production technology is assumed to have constant returns to 
scale. With regard to the second condition, Futagami al (1993), Greiner and Hanusch (1998) 
demonstrate that it is still not met. We assume therefore that it might not be essential for the 
optimization of growth. Derivation of the rate of growth with respect to consumption tax rate leads to 
the tax rate for which the growth rate is optimal5:  
                                                 
4
 Government tax revenues decrease in this case- a negative effect. 
5
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996) had showed that the optimal rate is given by * 1τ α= −  which corresponds to the 
optimal size of the government. 
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( )
*
11
2
c
y
s c
y
α τ
τ
α
− + −
=
−
 (16) 
 
Assume that the government chooses the tax rate at its optimal level *yτ . Recall that the actual 
optimal tax rate6 is equal to * *(1 (1 ))ye y ybτ β τ= − − . Thus, any increase (decrease) in corruption tends 
to diminish (increase) the effective optimal income tax rate. As regards the impact of corruption on 
public capital, it noteworthy that for 0gb = , all things being equal, the level of production increases. 
The right side term of the numerator in equation (15) becomes smaller, implying a lower optimal tax 
rate. This shows the adverse effect of corruption when the authorities ignore its actual magnitude. 
When targeting the optimal tax rate *yτ , public authorities only achieve a lower 
*y
eτ , generating a sub-
optimal growth rate.  
 
1.3.3- Optimal corruption tax versus optimal growth tax 
 
So far, we have established the optimal corruption tax ˆyτ at which the effect of corruption on 
economic growth is nil. In comparison with t *y , two situations can arise if one takes into account the 
characteristics of the economy as defined from the model’s parameters. These characteristics are 
influenced by the institutional context leading to inefficient policies.  
Algebraically, the comparison between the two tax rates could result from many 
combinations of parameters or variables of the model. In figure 17 below, we represent the gap 
*
ˆy yτ τ−  as a function of  and g yb b  when 0.1 0.25;  0.9  and - 75g k s c cα β τ= = = = . The graph 2 
clearly shows the two plausible situations: * *ˆ ˆ0 ou 0y y y yτ τ τ τ− < − > . 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In the event of all forms of corruption being absent, the optimal tax rate is given by: 
*
* * * *1- * *
0
1
 with  ,  
2
k ,  representing the optimal levels of g and k resulting from the 
maximization program of the representative firm
y
y g cb b b
s
y
y Ak g gα α
α
τ
α= = =
− +
= =
−
 
 
7
 z represents the growth rate (fig. 1) 
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Figure 1: Gap between optimal corruption and optimal growth tax 
 
In figure 2 below, we show these two situations with a third situation representing optimality 
without corruption.  
1) The tax rate of optimal growth is lower than the optimal tax rate of corruption. In such a 
case, corruption induces a growth rate below the optimal rate, but the effects are simultaneous. 
Accordingly, any increase in the tax rate would have a direct negative effect on growth but a positive 
effect via the effect of corruption on growth (Barreto, 2000 ; Coppier, 2005). Symmetrically, any 
decrease in taxation is beneficial to growth though implying an adverse effect of corruption.  
 2) The tax rate of optimal growth is higher than the optimal tax rate of corruption. Compared 
to a corruption-free situation, the impact of taxation is more negative on growth since it significantly 
reduces the rate of growth. The positive direct impact or the indirect effect through corruption that 
taxes may have on growth is inhibited by the excessive negative effects. 
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Graphique 2 : Taxe optimale de corruption et taxe optimale de croissance 
 
 
1.4- Implications of the model: testable hypotheses 
  
 Before turning to the empirical analyses, we can summarize the main results of the theoretical 
model and testable hypotheses.  
 First, all things being equal, economic growth in economies without corruption is higher than 
in most corrupt economies. However, from the optimum, any positive variation in the marginal rate 
of taxation induces a negative effect on growth which can be mitigated by the ability to pay bribes. 
Two hypotheses can be put forward:  
 
Hypothesis H1: The impact of taxation on growth in non linear. A particular case is the Laffer curve 
within which the increase in tax rate below a certain threshold has a positive effect on growth. 
 
Taxation and growth: Regime without 
corruption 
Taxation and growth: Regime with 
corruption 
 corruption 
Corruption 
Figure 2: Optimal tax of corruption and optimal tax of growth  
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Beyond this threshold, taxation is detrimental to growth. This is the result already established in the 
existing literature.  
 
Hypothesis H2: The impact of taxation on growth is a decreasing function of corruption. Corruption 
has two opposing detrimental effects on the marginal tax rate, which allows optimization of growth: 
either corruption reduces the tax rate below the optimal level, or it excessively increases it beyond 
this threshold. Hence, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
 
Hypothesis H3: In either of the above regimes, and in comparison to a regime without corruption, the 
effect of corruption on growth is as follows. When the tax rate caused by corruption is lower than the 
optimal level, any increase in taxation causes a reduction in growth. However, when the tax rate 
involving corruption is higher than the optimal level, the effect of corruption is likely to promote 
higher growth rates. 
 
 Section 2- Empirical analysis of corruption, taxation and growth nexus 
 The empirical approach comprises two stages. First, we do a non-parametric analysis of the 
correlation between government revenue and growth. This approach aims at determining the nature 
of the relationship (increased, decreased or monotone) between the two variables. In the second 
phase, our approach is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
 
2.1 Non-parametric analysis 
 The nonparametric approach aims to examine the relationship between the growth rate and 
taxation. Assume iy to be the growth rate, ix
 
the government revenues. The relationship between 
these two variables is described by the function f defined as: 
    ( )  i i iy f x ε= +  (17) 
Unlike the parametric analysis, the non parametric regression estimates the function ( )f x  with 
unknown functional form. This technique is an approximation of the true density ( )f x . For some 
couples of observations ( , )...( , )i i N Nx y x y , the local weighted local estimator of ( )f x  is given by:  
 1
1
ˆ ( ) ( )  
where ( ( )... ( )) is the vector of weight
N
n ni i
i
n NN
f x W x y
W x W x
=
=∑
 (18) 
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The weight used in this study is that of Nadayara-Watson:  
 
0
0
1
1
1
( )
( )
 is Kernel function, h is the width of the window (bandwidth)
i
i
x x
iNh h
ni N
x x
Nh h
i
K yW
K
K
−
−
=
=
∑  (19) 
The Kernel function is assumed to be Gaussian.  
 The analysis concerns on six periods: 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1999-2000, 2000-
2002 and 1980-2002. The variable of economic growth is from the World Penn Table 6.1. Unlike 
most studies using tax revenue, we measure taxation as total government revenue. Preference is 
given to total public revenue because it is less sensitive to the substitution effect involving the 
different components of public revenue (tax revenue and non tax revenue)8 (Chambas, 2005). Hence, 
government revenues used in this paper include both tax revenues and nontax revenues of central 
governments and subnational government and social security contributions. Also, the ratio of public 
revenues to GDP reflects the average tax burden of the whole economy. Y-axis stands for the growth 
rates and the x-axis the log or public revenue. 
 The results of nonparametric estimates are presented in figure 3 for each period of time as 
defined above. Dotted lines represent the upper and lower limits of the confidence interval at 5% 
level. The continuous lines represent the non parametric estimates. Y-axis and x-axis stand 
respectively for the growth rates and the log of public revenue ratio. 
These charts evidence a non monotonous relationship between government revenue ratio and 
growth in all the six periods under consideration. In other words, the overall trend in the different 
curves is either increasing or decreasing relationship between tax revenue and growth. These results 
are consistent with the theoretical predictions described in section 1 (Hypothesis H1). 
 The non-parametric analysis is useful in detecting the nature of correlation between economic 
growth and government revenues. The non linear relationship may appear in different forms, 
depending on a set of many other factors determining economic growth. However, applying non 
parametric analysis with more than two variables is a little complicated. The following paragraph 
introduces an econometric analysis in order to disentangle the influence of corruption in the 
relationship between taxation and growth. 
 
                                                 
8
 While this substitution effect may be less observable in some developing countries, it is not the case in African 
countries. For example in Benin, Togo or Ivory Coast, with privatization, a cut in the dividend revenues  (nontax 
revenue) from the enterprises with public participation leads to an increase in taxation of profits and capital gains in 
private sectors (tax revenue). The substitution effects were also perceptible when the levies on the “Caisse de 
Stabilization” had been suppressed in some countries in favor of taxes on exports.  
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Figure 3: Non Parametric analysis 
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2.2- The GMM approach 
2.2.1- The approach 
The estimated growth model takes the following form: 
 
'
0 i = + *  +it it it it it it i itGROWTH C R R C X Zβ β γ γ ν δ µ ε+ + + + +   (20) 
 
with it,  ,  R ,  it it itGROWTH C X  representing respectively growth rate, corruption, public revenue 
and the vector of other variables of control. iZ  is the vector of the time-invariant variables and iµ  
the country specific effect. (0,1)it Nε   is the term of errors,  and i t  represent the individual 
countries and periods. The inclusion of the interactive term between public revenues and 
corruption expresses in part the non linearity relationship between taxation and growth. 
 The regressions are based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) from a sample 
of 90 countries9 covering the period 1980-2002. As the theoretical model show, corruption is 
endogenous. In the literature, corruption and institutional variables are generally considered 
endogenous (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Dreher and Schneider, 
2006) since they are likely to affect growth but conversely growth could help to build better 
institutions and hence reduce corruption10.  
 
2.2.2- Choice of Instruments 
 Several variables could be used as instruments of the variable of corruption. The list of 
instruments is as follows.  
• Ethno-linguistic fractionalization: Used for the first time by Mauro (1995), this instrument 
has been used by other authors such as Neeman et al (2004), Dreher and Schneider (2006), 
Mocan (2004) and Mauro (1996). Exogeneity of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is supported by 
the fact that it has no direct impact on economic performance. Sala-i-Martin (1997) has shown in 
growth equations that the significance of this variable is not strong.  
• French and British legal origin: An instrument used by Pelligrini and Gerlargh (2004), 
Neeman et al (2004), Dreher and Schneider (2006) and based on arguments and results provided 
by La Porta et al (1999). The authors argue that these variables are determined by historical 
institutional factors and hence are exogenous with respect to economic growth.  
• Distance from equator and the mortality rate among settlers: These two variables are 
highly correlated and reflect the degree of influence of European culture in the former colonies 
                                                 
9
 The complete list of the countries is provided in appendix 1. 
10
 Another possible source of endogeneity is the measurement errors in the corruption index, which is based on 
subjective opinions.  
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because of the climatic conditions and the incidence of tropical diseases in the colonized 
countries. The establishment of good institutions depends on these factors (Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Acemoglu et al, 2001). 
 With respect to the economic growth, it is questionable whether they are relevant and 
exogenous because they may directly affect economic growth. One example is the distance from 
the equator (Sala-i-Matin, 1997). However, the use of such variables as instruments of corruption 
in growth equations by other authors gives them reliability and credibility. In all the 
specifications, we provide the tests of over identification of Hansen-Sargan. 
 
2.2.3- Other determinants of growth: variables of control 
 In addition to the variables of corruption and government revenues, we introduce a set of 
variables of control. Their inclusion is justified so as to avoid the bias on the coefficients of 
corruption and public revenues, our variables of interest. Not only do these variables are 
correlated with corruption and public revenues, but they also individually affect growth. The 
selected variables that are pertinent for the purpose of the present study are the following11:  
 1) Initial income in 1980 allows us to test the hypothesis of conditional convergence. A 
negative sign is expected for the coefficient associated with this variable.  
 2) Trade openness measured as the sum of exports and imports. The more open to the 
international market the economy is, the higher its growth rate is (Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
Further, trade policies seem to be one of the most important channel through which corruption 
affects growth (Pelligrini and Gerlagh, 2004). Thus, its omission could lead to bias. 
 3) Human capital as measured by the number of years of primary education and the 
number of years of secondary education and the growth rate of the population. Human capital is 
critical in increasing productivity. It is a decision variable for taxpayers (to pay or not taxes) since 
it determines the performance of public authorities in providing efficient education or health 
infrastructures, which in turn affect the tax morale of taxpayers. 
 4) Institutional and policy factors: We use the index of democracy and other institutional 
variables. Better institutional performance is expected to increase economic growth. 
 5) Public expenditure as measured by the share of government expenditure in final 
consumption in the GDP: its effects reflect the degree of public intervention in the economy. The 
sign expected for this variable can be positive or negative. 
 
                                                 
11
 For the definition of all the variables see appendix 2. 
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Section 3- Results of econometric estimations  
3.1- Results from GMM 
 The results in table 1 are organized around two major points: the impact of taxation on 
growth and the influence of corruption in this interaction.  
 Government revenues negatively affect economic growth (Rebelo and Easterly, 1993; 
Blankenau and Simpson, 2004; Blankenau et al., 2007)12. Although this result is in line with 
theoretical predictions, it is important at this level to emphasize our contribution compared to the 
previous studies. In their study on tax policy and growth over the period 1970-1988, Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) showed that the relationship between tax variables and growth is weak and that 
their significance depends on the variables of control. The authors explain this weakness by the 
multicolinearity among tax variables. The results of our study differ in several aspects. 
 The periods of study are not the same and hence our results (probably) reflect the 
characteristics of the countries in our sample over the period 1980-2002. In addition, our fiscal 
variables are not the same and from this point of view our study differs from that of Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993). These authors include in their models the marginal rate of income tax, the ratio of 
taxes on individual income to individual income and the ratio of taxes on consumption relative to 
consumption and investment. We look at overall revenues including both public income tax and 
non-tax revenues aggregated at the level of both central government and subnational governments 
and so avoided the problem of the substitution effect between the different components of public 
revenues common in developing countries (Chambas, 2005).  
 With regard to the impact of corruption, the coefficient of the interactive variable is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. In other words, in countries with high corruption, the 
negative impact of public resources on growth is greater. When public policy variables such as 
public spending on education, health and the infant mortality rate are included in our 
specifications, the coefficient of the variable corruption is positive and significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level (Column 2). This suggests that corruption has two effects on growth: a 
negative direct effect lowering both tax revenues and public expenditure, and an indirect positive 
effect positive once the adverse effects are accounted for. However, our estimations do not lend 
support to such an assumption and thus, hypothesis H3 is rejected.  
 The interaction between these variables and corruption in the explanation of the impact of 
taxation and corruption on growth is evidenced more clearly in columns (3) and (4). Excluding 
government spending on education and health from these specifications, the interactive term 
remains negative though not at the conventional levels of significance, but the variable of 
                                                 
12
 The authors include no institutional or governance variables in their specifications. 
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corruption becomes non significant. Given the non significance of the estimated coefficients, the 
results suggest that public spending on education and health have no direct impact on growth 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992). Landau and (1986) attributes the non significance of education 
spending to the inefficient use of public funds, of which large amounts are unproductive public 
expenditure and are not consistent with the objectives of growth (Miller and Russek, 1997). 
 
Table 1: Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
        
Log of GDP per capita in 1980 -0.754* -0.676 -0.612 -0.763** -0.704* -0.688* -1.033*** 
 (-1.77) (-1.65) (-1.45) (-2.15) (-1.80) (-1.75) (-2.92) 
Corruption 0.665 0.873** 0.257 0.0182 0.0466 0.137 0.521* 
 (1.46) (1.99) (0.73) (0.063) (0.15) (0.51) (1.66) 
Public revenue /GDP (PR) -1.538** -1.801*** -1.189**  -0.739 -0.970*  
 (-2.10) (-2.79) (-1.97)  (-1.23) (-1.78)  
Corruption*PR -0.149** -0.177** -0.0874     
 (-2.04) (-2.37) (-1.35)     
Public expenditure -0.447   -1.002** -0.738   
 (-0.76)   (-2.16) (-1.39)   
Education spending   0.801     -0.198 
  (0.89)     (-0.22) 
Health spending  -0.146     0.139 
  (-0.25)     (0.23) 
Infant mortality rate  -1.385*** -1.444***     -1.446*** 
 (-2.84) (-2.80)     (-2.93) 
Primary Education -1.153** -1.099** -1.012** -0.929** -0.972** -0.937** -0.883* 
 (-2.50) (-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.14) (-2.22) (-2.11) (-1.90) 
Secondary Education  0.493 0.452 0.770** 0.709** 0.779** 0.766** 0.346 
 (1.32) (1.18) (2.23) (2.04) (2.26) (2.21) (0.91) 
Trade openness 0.840** 0.915** 0.692** 0.517** 0.626** 0.608** 0.442 
 (2.53) (2.46) (2.19) (2.11) (2.24) (2.11) (1.52) 
Private investment ratio 1.519*** 1.497*** 1.927*** 1.779*** 1.877*** 1.891*** 1.248** 
 (3.26) (3.15) (4.39) (3.88) (4.28) (4.30) (2.51) 
Growth rate of population -0.530** -0.545** -0.817*** -0.784*** -0.821*** -0.859*** -0.573** 
 (-2.31) (-2.20) (-4.14) (-4.11) (-4.23) (-4.45) (-2.55) 
Index of democracy 0.0833 0.156 0.0316 0.0511 0.0500 0.0713 0.169 
 (0.38) (0.71) (0.15) (0.24) (0.22) (0.32) (0.76) 
Constant 11.77** 8.822 3.788 5.081 5.303 3.566 9.692* 
 (2.05) (1.56) (0.81) (0.96) (0.98) (0.75) (1.85) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
R-squared 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.07 
J statistics of Hansen 3.418 2.465 7.090 6.188 6.914 7.004 2.462 
(p-value de J) 0.332 0.482 0.0691 0.103 0.0747 0.0718 0.482 
Robust statistics t of student in parentheses *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% 
 
 
3.2- Instrumenting both corruption and public revenue: three stage 
 generalized least squares 
 In the previous section, only corruption was considered as an endogenous variable. 
However, the variable of government revenue can also be endogenous, as demonstrated in the 
theoretical models in section 2. Furthermore, two bodies of theoretical literature emphasize the 
endogeneity of the variables of tax policies (Rebelo and Easterly, 1993). On the one hand, the 
models of optimal tax policy assume a benevolent authority that maximizes the welfare of a 
representative household. In this context, taxes are not imposed on the economic agents but may 
result from an optimal choice of the public authorities. On the other hand, the political economy 
approach considers that public policies resulting from a political process (Alesina and Perotti, 
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1994), are not free of corrupt behavior. We therefore instrumented both variables at the same 
time by using the method of three stage generalized least squares (3SLS). We have three different 
equations: one for growth, one for government revenue and one for corruption. Each of these 
three variables is explained by its potential determinants (  et it iX Z ). The system of equation is: 
 
 
'
'
'
   
   
   
it g g git g it g it g gi gi git
it r r rit r it r ri ri rit
it c c cit c ci ci cit
GROWTH X R C Z
R X C Z
C X Z
α β ψ λ γ µ ε
α β λ γ µ ε
α β γ µ ε
 = + + + + + +

= + + + + +

= + + + +
 (21) 
  
 The method of three stages least squares (table 2)13 leads to results consistent with those 
previously established (table 1). Different specifications demonstrate once again that government 
revenues negatively affect economic growth. The comparison of columns (1), (3) and (9) 
confirms the intuition of Easterly and Rebelo (1993) according to which there is a strong 
correlation between income tax variables and the initial revenue. The interaction of government 
revenue with corruption supports the hypothesis that the distorting effect of tax would be greater 
in highly corrupt countries. This interaction is influenced by the variables of public expenditure 
in education and health (see columns (5) and (7)), which mainly affect government revenue and 
have little or no effect on growth. 
                                                 
13
 To save space, the coefficients of the equation of corruption are not reported. Results are available upon request 
from the author  
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 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 SYSTEM1  SYSTEM2  SYSTEM3  SYSTEM4  SYSTEM5 
 GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT 
Log GDP per capita in 1980    -1.007***       0.166***  -0.749** 0.155*** 
    (2.91)       (5.46)  (2.41) (5.09) 
Public Revenue/GDP (PR)  -2.783**   -0.336   -3.413***   -2.997***   -0.363  
 (2.34)   (0.25)   (2.83)   (3.00)   (0.28)  
Corruption*PR       -0.074   -0.058**   -0.052*  
       (1.32)   (2.05)   (1.85)  
Corruption  -0.018   -0.041  0.311 -0.011   -0.017   -0.015 
  (0.67)   (1.56)  (0.95) (0.62)   (1.00)   (0.87) 
Education expenditure 0.066 0.169*  -0.347 0.163*  0.489 0.170*   0.149   0.149 
 (0.07) (1.78)  (0.40) (1.72)  (0.52) (1.81)   (1.64)   (1.63) 
Health expenditure -0.469 -0.071  -0.100 -0.065  -0.617 -0.075   -0.097*   -0.100* 
 (0.85) (1.19)  (0.18) (1.09)  (1.11) (1.25)   (1.68)   (1.72) 
Infant mortality rate -0.592 -0.168***  -0.860** -0.155***  -0.771* -0.171***   -0.032   -0.044 
 (1.61) (5.22)  (2.24) (4.91)  (1.76) (6.25)   (0.90)   (1.25) 
Investment ratio 1.181***   1.299***   1.264***   1.430***   1.494***  
 (3.52)   (3.91)   (3.70)   (4.38)   (4.54)  
Trade openness 0.750** 0.174***  0.390 0.164***  1.008*** 0.177***  0.912*** 0.159***  0.495 0.159*** 
 (2.15) (5.63)  (1.09) (5.27)  (2.64) (5.94)  (2.71) (5.48)  (1.40) (5.47) 
Primary education -1.039**   -0.952**   -1.085**   -0.942**   -0.849*  
 (2.13)   (1.96)   (2.22)   (1.99)   (1.78)  
Secondary education 0.523   0.510   0.544   0.658*   0.646*  
 (1.51)   (1.49)   (1.56)   (1.93)   (1.90)  
Population growth -0.702***   -0.685***   -0.684***   -0.832***   -0.856***  
 (3.40)   (3.34)   (3.27)   (4.40)   (4.54)  
Democracy  -0.180 -0.010  -0.145 -0.027  -0.047 -0.004  -0.164 -0.013  -0.110 -0.013 
 (1.42) (0.48)  (1.15) (1.31)  (0.25) (0.24)  (1.37) (0.76)  (0.90) (0.75) 
 0.068**   0.074**   0.066*   0.067**   0.077** Degree of monetization (M2/GDP) 
 (1.99)   (2.14)   (1.93)   (2.03)   (2.30) 
               
Constant 8.689** 2.526***  12.327*** 2.668***  8.411* 2.480***  5.687** 0.718  5.667** 0.821* 
 (2.11) (7.58)  (2.88) (8.04)  (1.91) (8.08)  (2.28) (1.60)  (2.26) (1.82) 
Observations 445 445  445 445  445 445  445 445  445 445 
R-squared 0.13 0.37  0.16 0.34  0.11 0.38  0.13 0.41  0.15 0.41 
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 3.3- Further test with KKM (2003) data 
 The estimates presented here are based on the method of three stages least squares. As 
in subsection 4.1, the system of equations (21) is estimated. We have four periods 
corresponding to the data of KKM (2003): 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. 
 The results in Table 3 are as follows. First, the variable of public revenue is not 
significant even if its coefficient is positive. The coefficient of the variable of corruption is 
negative and significant depending on the model. This result could be explained by the 
interaction between the variables of corruption and public revenue but, as suggested by Renelt 
and Levine (1992), the discrepancy between the coefficient obtained in our study and the 
negative coefficient obtained from the ICRG data could be due to a difference in the data 
used.  
 A second result is irrefutable, however. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
significant and negative. This result is consistent with those obtained previously and is 
amplified by the adverse effect of corruption on public revenue. Finally, in comparison with 
the ICRG corruption variable, other variables in the model, including the trade openness, 
investment ratios are not significant. 
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Table 3 : Tests of robustness using KKM(2003) data (3SLS) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 SYSTEM1  SYSTEM2  SYSTEM3  SYSTEM4  SYSTEM5 
 GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT  GROWTH RT 
Log GDP per capita in 1980    -1.151*   -1.091*        
    (1.66)   (1.68)        
Corruption  -0.169***  0.582 -0.203***   -0.064***  0.099 -0.041**   -0.041** 
  (6.40)  (0.89) (8.75)   (3.63)  (0.13) (2.15)   (2.15) 
Corruption*RT       -0.218***   -0.239   -0.222***  
       (3.33)   (1.50)   (3.54)  
Public Revenue/GDP (PR)  2.035   3.880   0.895   1.453   1.297  
 (1.06)   (1.38)   (0.42)   (0.74)   (0.73)  
Public expenditure/GDP          -1.566   -1.588*  
          (1.60)   (1.70)  
-0.083 0.119  -0.392 0.121  0.018 0.110   0.110   0.110 Education expenditure  
(0.07) (1.43)  (0.33) (1.46)  (0.02) (1.34)   (1.33)   (1.33) 
0.032 -0.040  0.837 -0.069  0.373 0.029   0.048   0.048 Health expenditure 
 (0.05) (0.73)  (1.04) (1.29)  (0.55) (0.58)   (0.94)   (0.94) 
0.279 -0.020  0.023 -0.002  0.134 -0.066*  0.287 -0.078**  0.300 -0.078** Infant mortality rate 
 (0.59) (0.55)  (0.05) (0.07)  (0.29) (1.96)  (0.59) (2.28)  (0.65) (2.28) 
Investment ratio  -0.421   0.043   -0.088   -0.425   -0.448  
 (0.64)   (0.06)   (0.13)   (0.63)   (0.70)  
Trade openness 0.492 0.145***  0.384 0.132***  0.931 0.187***  0.881 0.195***  0.874 0.195*** 
 (0.75) (3.52)  (0.54) (3.18)  (1.45) (4.85)  (1.42) (5.06)  (1.44) (5.07) 
Primary education 0.824   0.807   0.928   0.867   0.867  
 (1.00)   (0.96)   (1.13)   (1.07)   (1.07)  
Secondary education -0.946   -0.313   -0.666   -0.956   -0.986  
 (1.51)   (0.41)   (1.05)   (1.35)   (1.57)  
-0.143   -0.161   -0.202   -0.199   -0.198  Population growth 
 (0.65)   (0.72)   (0.94)   (0.92)   (0.92)  
Democracy  0.108 -0.071***  0.568* -0.095***  0.047 0.005  -0.026 0.021  -0.056 0.021 
 (0.47) (3.21)  (1.73) (4.50)  (0.20) (0.28)  (0.09) (1.13)  (0.25) (1.13) 
Degree of monetization (M2/GDP)  0.042   0.026   0.075*   0.086**   0.086** 
  (1.03)   (0.65)   (1.96)   (2.21)   (2.20) 
Constant -6.769 3.286***  -7.600 3.618***  6.313 2.291***  0.863 2.067***  1.774 2.067*** 
 (1.38) (9.43)  (0.72) (10.99)  (1.36) (7.98)  (0.12) (7.02)  (0.43) (7.02) 
Observations 365 365  365 365  365 365  365 365  365 365 
R-squared -0.02 0.11  -0.14 0.01  0.06 0.29  0.05 0.30  0.06 0.30 
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 Conclusion 
 This paper analyses the corruption, growth and taxation nexus. Previous studies have 
shown the positive or negative relationship between taxes and growth. Our contributions are 
as follows.  
 We have extended these investigations by integrating corruption in an endogenous 
growth model in two ways: corruption in public spending and corruption in taxation. We 
showed two opposing effects. Under certain conditions, corruption can positively affect the 
rate of growth. The second effect of corruption, which seems to be the more devastating, is its 
negative impact on growth through taxes. Not only does it tend to make sub-optimal tax rate 
that maximizes the rate of growth in the long term, but it can also create distortions leading to 
excessive tax rates harmful to growth. 
 The other novel contribution of this work is the development of a non parametric 
analysis of the correlation between public revenue and growth. The non-parametric analysis 
suggests a non linear relationship between public revenue and growth. Furthermore, several 
specifications using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and the three stages least 
squares (3SLS) make it possible to conclude that in the most corrupt countries there is a 
higher impact of taxation on growth. Even though our theoretical model suggests the 
existence of a beneficial effect of corruption in terms of economic growth, such an effect is 
not supported by our data.  
The present paper can be extended by looking at the individual component of the tax 
structure and its relationship with corruption and economic growth. Consistent with the 
current tax transition reforms in developing countries, it is important to emphasize the effect 
of two tax components: value added taxes and taxes on international trade. Since VAT 
introduction imply trade tariffs reduction in developing countries under reform, future 
analyses might help evaluate how well the tax reforms perform in terms of economic 
activities development.  
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  Appendix A1: List of countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Algeria  
Argentina  
Australia  
Austria  
Bangladesh  
Belgium  
Bolivia  
Botswana 
Brazil  
Cameroon  
Canada  
Chile 
China  
Colombia  
Republic of Congo  
Costa Rica  
Cyprus  
Denmark  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt. 
Salvador  
Finland  
France *Gambia,  
Ghana  
Greece  
Guatemala  
Guyana  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Hong Kong  
Hungary  
Iceland  
India  
Indonesia  
Iran  
Ireland  
New Zealand  
Israel  
 
Italy Jamaica  
Japan  
Jordan  
Kenya  
Malawi  
Malaysia  
Mali  
Malta  
Mexico  
Mozambique  
Low Country  
Nicaragua  
Niger  
Norway  
Pakistan  
Panama  
Papua New Guinea  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Philippines  
Portugal  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
South Africa  
Spain  
Sri Lanka  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Syria  
Thailand  
Togo  
Tunisia  
Turkey  
Uganda  
United Kingdom  
The United States  
Uruguay  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix A2- : Definition of the variables 
 
Variables  Definition sources 
Public revenues Fiscal revenue+ non fiscal revenue of central administration 
and subnational governments and social contributions of social 
security 
Brun, Chambas et. 
al .(2005) 
GDP in 1980 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (RGDPCH 
[17]) 
Growth rate Growth rate of real GDP  
Investment ratio Investment divided by GDP (KI[24]) 
World Pen Table 6.1 
Subjective perception index of experts : acts of corruption in 
the political sphere and public administration (nepotism, 
patronage, favoritism, asking for bribes …) (rescaled from 0 
(low corruption) to 10 (higher corruption)  
ICRG, 2003 
Corruption 
Composite Index : Control of  corruption (rescaled from 0 
(low corruption) to 10 (higher corruption) KKM(2003) 
Public expenditure General government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most 
expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes 
government military expenditures that are part of government 
capital formation. %GDP 
Education expenditure Public expenditure on education consists of public spending 
on public education plus subsidies to private education at the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. %GDP. 
Health expenditure Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital 
spending from government (central and local) budgets, 
external borrowings and grants (including donations from 
international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), 
and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. %GDP 
Infant mortality rate Infant mortality rate under 5 years old for 1000 
Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by 
GDP  
Foreign aid Official development assistance +official aid % GNI 
Population growth Annual population growth rate. Population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which counts all residents 
regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees 
not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of the country of 
origin. 
WDI (2005) 
Primary education  Number of years in primary education in the total population 
Secondary education Number of years in secondary education in the total 
population 
Barro et Lee (2000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
Probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to 
different ethnic groups : 
( )2M i
i=1
th
i
n
FRAC=1- ; M=number of ethnic groups, N= total 
N
population, n =number of people belonging to the i  ethnic group
∑
 
Religious fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong 
to different ethnic groups : 
Alesina et al; (2003) 
British legal origin Equal to 1 if a country has a British legal system, zero elsewhere 
French legal origin Equal to 1 if a country has a French legal system, zero elsewhere 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
